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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




vs. ) Case No. 14115 
) 
BOARD OF STATE LANDS OF ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Beginning in 1963, Appellants held State of Utah oil shale 
leases which originally had ten year terms but which Appellants 
believed to have been extended through 1983. Respondents declared 
the leases terminated as of December 31, 19#3, and denied extension, 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment upholding Respondents 
in their refusal to recognize the continuing validity of the 
leases. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Appellants sued under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act for 
a declaration that conduct of the parties had effected an extension 
of the leases. The parties conceded that their evidence (including 
affidavits covering all testimony they would adduce at trial) was 
before the court, and the court, on Respondents1 Motion for Suramary 
Judgment, ruled that Appellants had no cause of action as a matter 
of law. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues here presented are: 
1. Whether a jury could reasonably find that the 
parties extended the leases by implied contract. 
2. Whether a jury could reasonably find that Respon-
dents are estopped to deny the extension of the 
leases and Appellants' opportunity to correct any 
deficiency in their procedures for extension. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of this statement, the Board of State Lands 
will be called the "Board", and its director (as of the time of 
the action being described) will be called the "Director". 
Appellants Morgan, Justheim and Justheim Petroleum Company will 
be called the "Morgans", and Appellant Husky Oil Company will be 
called "Husky". The oil shale leases in questions will be called 
the "Leases". 
The chronology of relevant events is as follows: 
1. In 1963, the Board issued the Leases, to expire by their 
terms on December 31, 19f3, to the Morgans (admitted in pleadings) 
2. In 1964, the Morgans assigned the Leases to Husky, but 
remained the lessees of record to whom the Board sent notices and 
billings (R.113). 
3. In 1965, the Board adopted a 20 year lease form, and 
passed a resolution that lessees under previously issued oil 
shale leases should have opportunity to convert to the nev; form 
(R. 9-11, admitted in pleadings). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4. On September 29, 1965, the Director sent to all oil 
shale lessees a letter (herein called the "September Letter") 
in which a procedure for converting to the new 20 year lease 
form was explained (R. 21). That "procedure" was never included 
in the "Conversion" section of the Board's Rules and Regulations 
Governing Mineral Leases (herein called the "Regulations") even 
though the Regulations were revised in November of 1965 and on six 
occasions thereafter while the Leases were clearly in effect 
(R. 153) and specifically covered conversion procedures (R. 165). 
5. The record does not show that either Husky or the Morgans 
ever followed the conversion procedure suggested by the September 
Letter. The only evidence, however, (R. 114) is that they believed 
they had done whatever was necessary to convert to the new form. 
Their conviction was corroborated by the facts that: 
(a) the Board, at some time between 1965 and 1973, 
revised its accounting records for the Leases to show 
their expiration in 1983 rather than 1973 (R. 43 and 50, 
Response to Request No. 2), and 
(b) in the late fall of 1973, the Board sent Appellants 
billings for the Leases covering the 1974 lease year, a 
year during which the Leases would not even have been 
operative unless they were extended. The billings called 
for rentals at a rate ($1.00 per acre) which could not 
have been payable under the Leases as originally issued 
(R. 114) . 
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6. Within the 1973 lease year, Appellants paid the 1974 
rentals for the Leases as billed by the Board (R. 114, 128). 
Had they not been so billed, Appellants v/ould have made inquiry 
to determine why they had not been billed and would have corrected 
any claimed deficiencies in conversion procedure while the Leases 
as originally issued were still in effect (R. 115). 
7. Early in 1974, after the Board had cashed Appellants' 
rental payment check, the Board returned the money to. Appellants 
with the announcement that it considered the Leases to have 
expired (R. 50-52). 
It is noteworthy that the Board has consistently expressed 
its regret that it must treat the Leases as having expired. The 
Attorney General has issued his opinion that the Board is power-
less to do otherwise. It would be a mistake to approach the 
matter as a problem related to the scope of administrative 




BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT 
HAS RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT 
SUPPORT JURY FINDINGS OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
OR ESTOPPEL 
We need not labor the point that a summary judgment is 
improper when there is any material issue of fact (see Dupler 
v. Yates, 10 U2d 251, 351 P.2d 624; Tanner v. Utah Poultr" & 
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Farmers Co-op, 11 U2d 353, 359 P.2d 18. In Bullock v. Desert 
Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, this Court 
took a strong position, in accord with the prevailing view, that 
summary judgment is proper only where the prevailing party shows 
that his adversary could not, if given a trial, produce evidence 
which would support findings in his favor. At page 561 of the 
Pacific report, this Court said: 
"A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law; such showing must 
preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser 
could, if given a trial, produce evidence which 
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." 
In the instant case, Appellants plead an implied contract 
and, in the alternative, estoppel. Appellants believed the 
evidence (which will later herein be discussed in detail) justified 
findings that an implied contract had been made as a matter of law, 
and that all of the elements of estoppel were present. The trial 
court ruled that the evidence could not even justify a jury in 
finding for Appellants on either the implied contract issue or 
the estoppel issue. 
While Appellants brought this action under the Utah Declara-
tory Judgment Act, they did not thereby waive their right to have 
issues of fact presented to a jury. This is the general rule in 
America; American Jurisprudence states it, at 22 Am. Jur. 2d 960, 
as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The courts, under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act and similar statutes, as well as 
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, generally 
recognize the right to jury trial on those issues 
in regard to which either party could have claimed 
a jury in any action for which the declaratory judg-
ment action may be regarded as a substitute." 
and this Court so held in Oil Shale Corporation v. Larson, 20 
U2d 369, 433 P.2d 540. 
Among issues historically submitted to juries in contract 
cases are (1) v/hether conduct indicates a promise (see Peters 
v. Poro, 96 Vt. 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615), (2) renewal of a 
contract (Adamson v. McKean, 208 Iowa 949, 225 NW 414), and 
(3) authority to contract (Ogdensburg & LCR Co. v. Pratt, 22 
U.S. 123, 22 L. Ed. 327. In this connection, see 75 Am.Jur. 
2d 441, Trial Sec. 396. We submit that, while reasonable minds 
might differ, a jury could find that the conduct of Respondents 
in this case implied a promise to renew or extend the Leases. 
Refering again to American Jurisprudence, its editors say: 
"Where different conclusions may reasonably 
be drawn by different minds from the same evidence, 
the question is ordinarily one for the jury. This 
is true not only where the uncertainty is caused 
by a substantial conflict in the testimony, but 
also where the facts are undisputed but are such 
that different conclusions may reasonably be 
drawn from them. ft (75 Am.Jur. 2d 394) 
With regard to waiver and estoppel, American Jurisprudence 
has this to say: 
"Whether there has been a forfeiture of a 
right is, when the facts are admitted or proved 
and lead to only one reasonable inference, a question 
of lav/ for the court; but where the facts out of which 
the forfeiture is claimed to have arisen are in dispute 
or different conclusions may be drawn therefrom, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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question should be determined by the jury. 
Whether there has been a waiver is generally 
a question of fact, unless the facts and cir-
cumstances relating to the subject of waiver 
are admitted or are clearly established, in 
which case waiver becomes a question of law 
if only one reasonable inference may be drawn 
therefrom. Waiver of a forfeiture or of right 
to a jury trial has been held to be for the 
jury. Likewise, upon an issue of estoppel, 
where only one inference can reasonably be 
drawn from undisputed facts, the question of 
estoppel is one of law for the determination 
of the court, but where there is a dispute as 
to the facts involving an estoppel, or more 
than one inference may be drawn from undisputed 
facts, the question becomes one for the triers 
of fact—the jury in a case tried by a jury." 
(75 Am.Jur.2d 432) 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WOULD JUSTIFY A JURY IN 
FINDING EXTENSION OF THE LEASES BY 
IMPLIED CONTRACT 
It is a well established principle of lav; that, in the 
absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the parties 
to a written contract may modify it by parol, and the facts of 
such modification may be implied by their conduct. The Corpus 
Juris statement on the subject is as follows: 
MA modification of a contract may be 
effected by an explicit agreement to modify, 
either in writing or by parol, as discussed 
infra §377; but the agreement to modify a 
contract need not be express, and the fact 
of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence, a~iT 
discussed infra §375." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Unless otherwise provided by statute, it 
is not essential that the mutual assent of the 
parties to modify the contract be express, as 
discussed supra §374, and it may be implied 
from acts and circumstances. So, the fact 
of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence." 
(17A CJS 424 and 427, excerpts from Sees. 
374 and 375, with emphasis added) 
This appears to be the law even though the parties may have 
provided in their written agreement that modification must be 
in writing. The editors of American Jurisprudence (17 Am.Jur.. 
2d 937) say: 
"The rule followed by the courts generally, 
with some authority to the contrary, is that 
although the parties to a contract may stipulate 
that it is not to be varied except by agreement 
in writing, they may, in the absence of statutory 
provision to the contrary, by a subsequent contract 
not in writing, modify it by mutual consent." 
This Court had occasion to comment on the subject of implied 
contract in Kimball Elevator Company v. Elevator Supplies Company, 
2 U2d 289, 272 P.2d 583. The facts in that case are not similar 
to ours, but this Court there confirmed that, in Utah as elsewhere, 
a contract may be established by conduct alone without any expres-
sion in writing or by parol. The appropriate quote from the case 
is as follows: 
"It is of course conceded that a contract may 
be made out even though there are no express words 
formally stating it, and the promise may be inferred 
wholly or in part from such conduct as justified the 
promissee in understanding that the promissor intended 
to make it." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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We find no Utah case where the promise inferred from 
conduct was specifically to extend a lease. There are, 
however, a number of cases from other jurisdictions where 
a lease extension has been held to have been effected by 
implied agreement. Among them are Walker v. Ferguson, 130 
So. .64, 221 Ala. 549; Alhandy v. Gerchi, 202 Cal.Ap. 2d 806; 
Ochsner v. Langendorf, 174 Pac. 392, 115 Colo 453; HeSweeney 
v. Porn, 158 A 38, 104 Vt. 110; Smith v. Arthur D. Little, 
276 Cal. Ap. 2d 391, Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294 A 2d 
598, 63 NJ 402. The particular circumstances vary, of course, 
from case to case, but the conduct of the parties in every case 
was held to effect an extension. We find no authority that a 
promise to extend a lease is less easily inferable than any 
other kind of promise. In Ochsner, the extension was declared 
on no other evidence than the lessor's acceptance of rental 
after the term. There was no evidence there, as here, that the 
lessor had both billed and received rental for an entire year. 
In the instant case, the conduct of the parties is in no 
sense ambiguous. The Board indicated its understanding that 
the Leases were extended not only by amending its accounting 
records to show an additional ten year account period but also 
by billing and receiving 1974 rental at a rate v/hich could only 
apply to a period beyond the initial term of the lease. Appellants 
indicated their understanding that the lease relationship was 
now to be governed by the "new form" lease by paying the 197 4 
rental at the new form rate before the 1974 lease had expired. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The revision of accounting records, the billings of 1974 
rentals, and the acceptance of 1974 rentals are not the only 
pieces of conduct which (using the phraseology of KirabaU Elevator) 
"justified" Appellants "in understanding that" the Board "intended 
to" extend the Leases. There is the further fact that the Board 
failed to mention any conversion procedure for oil shale leases 
in the Regulations even though a section of the Regulations is 
devoted to "conversion", and the Regulations were revised in 
November of 1965 and on several occasions thereafter. 
The Board's failure to treat the procedure for converting 
old form to new form oil shale leases in the Regulations is 
particularly significant because it was under direct statutory 
obligation to do so. Section 65-1-96, UCA 1953 as amended 1967, 
provides: 
"All mineral leases issued by the land board 
prior to the effective date of this act and in good 
standing on such date shall continue for the term 
specified therein and shall be subject to the condi-
tions and provisions contained therein; provided, 
however, the land board may permit such lessees to 
convert such existing leases to the form of lease 
which shall be adopted by the land board pursuant 
to authority contained in this act, such conversion 
to be in accordance with rules and regulations 
promulgated by the land board." 
After the effective date of this section, Appellants as holders 
of previously issued oil shale leases were entitled to rely on 
the Regulations as the authoritative source of information with 
regard to conversion procedure. Whatever may have happened to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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their copy of the September Letter, Appellants were not obliged 
to recognize it, even if they had constructive knowledge of its 
content, as superior to regulation. Since the September Letter 
calls for an "application" to be filed for the new lease form, 
the Board had a second statutory obligation to cover the subject 
by "rules and regulations". Section 65-1-23, UCA 1953 as amended, 
provides: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
state land board shall by rules and regulations 
prescribe the form of application, the form of 
lease, the annual rental, the amount of royalty 
and the basis upon which the royalty shall be 
computed, and such other details as it may deem 
necessary in the interest of the state." 
Appellants could have perused all the Regulations and all appli-
cable statutes without becoming aware of the content of the 
September Letter. In view of the quoted statute, they could feel 
secure that there was no conversion procedure not covered by the 
Regulations. 
It appears to be Respondents' position that, once the September 
Letter was transmitted, it was no longer possible for the principles 
of implied contract to apply. Since a written agreement can be 
modified without writing even though it specifically provides to 
the contrary (see authorities supra) we cannot accept the proposi-
tion that the September Letter put the Leases beyond the power of 
the parties to modify the Leases by procedures other than those 
suggested in the September Letter. This is particularly true since 
(1) the September Letter does not purport to state an exclusive 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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means of conversion, and (2) the September Letter was never 
sanctified by any Board action reflected by the minutes (i.e. 
the Director was never instructed or authorized to send it). 
We cannot conceive that the September Letter supercedes the 
Regulations, particularly on a subject which is statutorily re-
quired to be covered by regulation. 
It is true that the January 20, 1965 Board minutes show 
that "exchange" of leases was Board approved "on the basis of 
6$£ per acre". This is, in fact, the only minute entry which 
speaks to the exchange or conversion fee question. All applicable 
minute entries are attached to the complaint (R. 9-10). Nothing 
in the Board's minutes of any meeting suggests that a failure 
to pay the conversion fee within the original lease term will 
terminate the lease without notice. As a matter of practice, 
lessees frequently rely on Section 65-1-90, UCA 1953 as amended, 
which reads as follows: 
"Upon violation by lessee of any lawful 
provision in a mineral lease, the state land 
board may, at its option, cancel the lease after 
thirty days' notice by registered or certified 
return receipt mail, unless the lessee remedies 
the violation or rectifies the condition within 
said thirty days or within such extension of time 
as the board may grant." 
As soon as Appellants became aware that a failure on their part 
to pay a conversion fee was claimed, they undertook to pay the 
fee, but payment was refused. They were certainly given no thirty 
day period within which to rectify a claimed delinquency. 
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POINT III 
A JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THE FACTS TO 
BE SUCH THAT THE BOARD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY 
THE EXTENSION OF THE LEASES 
The concept of estoppel is well understood, and the court 
which should require little citation of authority as to its 
nature. It applies whenever one party has reasonably acted (or 
failed to act) to its detriment and was induced to so act or fail 
to act by the conduct of the party against whom the doctrine is 
invoked. In. Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal CIT Corpora-
— — , — . : i • — , fti 
tion, 4 U2d 155, 289 P2d 1045, this Court quoted with approval 
the following language from Fergason Co, v. Furst, 287 F. 306: 
"Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the 
notion that, when one person makes representations 
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a 
given way, the one making such representations will 
not be permitted to change his position when such 
change v/ould bring about unequitable consequences 
to the other person, who relied on the representations 
and acted thereon in good faith. The representations 
made must be in themselves sufficient to warrant the 
action taken." 
In this case, the conduct of the Board which induced Appel-
lants to act as they did (i.e. pay the rentals and refrain from 
an inquiry which v/ould have resulted in their following whatever 
procedure the Board required for extension) was the publication 
of the Regulations which said nothing about oil shale lease con-
version and the transmittal of billings for the Leases covering 
the 1974 lease year at a rate which was only consistent with an 
accomplished substitution of the August 1965 oil shale lease form 
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for the lease form in which the leases had been issued in 1963. 
That billing (coupled with the change in accounting records) 
was an affirmative action by the Board unequivocal in its impli-
cations. Appellants payment of 1974 rentals in 1973 was likewise 
unequivocal. 
It is recognized that estoppel has limited applicability 
to government agencies. The limitation applies only to situations 
where the agency is acting in a governmental (as opposed to a 
proprietary) capacity. The editors of American Jurisprudence 
(28 Am.Jur.2d 784) state the legal proposition as follows: 
"Thus, as a general rule, the doctrine of 
estoppel will not be applied against the state 
in its governmental, public, or sovereign capacity, 
unless its application is necessary to prevent 
fraud or manifest injustice. The state cannot, 
by operation of a mere estoppel in pais, be 
deprived of its right to legislate, nor can 
claims against the state be created by estoppel. 
Under some circumstances, however, a state 
may be held estopped if an individual would have 
been held estopped. . . . A state may be held 
estopped when acting in a proprietary or contractual 
capacity.3 Also, there is authority that a state 
may be deemed estopped when the acts of its officials, 
alleged to constitute the ground of estoppel, are 
done in the exercise of powers expressly conferred 
by law, and when acting within the scope of their 
authority. So, a department of a state government, 
in a matter of procedure and within the scope of 
departmental powers, may be estopped." 
Among the many cases cited under footnote 8 is 
Utah Power & Light Company v. United States, 2 30 Fed. 
328. 
Obviously, the state acts in a proprietary capacity when 
it enters into contracts with regard to state owned lands. A 
case directly in point is State ex rel Shell Oil Co. v. Register 
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of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519. There, the 
State attempted to declare a lease invalid because of irregu-
larities in the procedures by which it had been offered two 
years previously. The court held that the state was estopped 
to deny the lease validity after having accepted two years of 
rentals under it. 
We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been 
applied directly against the Utah State Land Board, but, in 
Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28 U2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), 
Provo City was held estopped to deny the dismissal of a condemna-
tion suit after having made representations to the court, just 
before trial, that the city was withdrawing. The following is 
the lead headnote from the Utah Reporter: 
"Condemnor should not be permitted to 
represent to court that action was to be abandoned 
and dismissed for purpose of avoiding trial and 
thereafter to contend that action was still pending 
for purpose of avoiding payment of expenses and 
attorney's fees. U.C.A."1953, 78-34-16." 
Recently (1972) the Arizona Court held that estoppel applied 
against a school district in its contractual relationship with a 
teacher. In Board of Trustees v. Wildermath, 10 Ariz. App. 171, 
492 P.2d 420,.the court held the district was estopped to deny 
that a teacher was covered by health insurance from the date of 
employment even though the district's contract with its group 
carrier provided otherwise. 
We submit, in the instant case, that nothing about the 
history of dealings between the parties obliged Appellants to 
put a different connotation on the Board's conduct from the 
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obvious one* After (1) changing its accounting records, (2) 
billing for 1974, (3) accepting the 1974 rentals as billed, 
and (4) publishing its Regulations which were silent with regard 
to any conversion procedure for oil shale leases, the Board is 
estopped, at the very least, to deny Appellants1 right to correct 
whatever procedural deficiencies are now perceived. 
POINT IV 
THE ACTS OF THE BOARD, ITS DIRECTORS, AND 
ITS EMPLOYEES ON WHICH APPELLANTS RELIED 
ARE NOT VITIATED BY REASON OF LACK OF 
AUTHORITY 
The trial court specifically found that the conduct on which 
Appellants relied (i.e. the amendment of accounting records, the 
transmittal of 1974 billings, the acceptance of 1974 rentals, 
and the failure to include oil shale lease conversion instructions 
in the Regulations) was not "authorized" by any board minute entry 
and that Appellants were therefore not justified in relying on 
that conduct. 
All of the conduct is clearly within the apparent authority 
of the Respondents. The statutes which are pertinent in this 
regard are Sections 65-1-2.1 and 3.1 which read as follows: 
"There is created the division of state lands, 
which shall be within the department of natural 
resources under the administration and general 
supervision of the executive director of natural 
resources and under the policy direction of the 
board of state lands. The division of state lands 
shall be the state land authority for the state 
of Utah, shall assume all of the functions, powers,-
duties, rights and responsibilities of the state 
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land board except those which are delegated to the 
board of state lands by this act and is vested with 
such other functions, powers, duties, rights and 
responsibilities as provided in this act and other 
law. 
The director of the division of state lands 
shall be appointed by the board of state lands with 
the concurrence of the executive director of natural 
resources. The director shall be the executive and 
administrative head of the division of state lands 
and shall be a person experienced in administration 
of and a qualified executive in land management. 
The director shall have executive authority and 
control of the division and employees to the end 
that the policies of the board may be carried out. 
The director shall administer all land laws within 
the jurisdiction of the division of state lands and 
perform such other duties as may be provided for by 
law." 
The law has never excused any corporate body for the conse-
quences of its agents' mistakes even though it is apodictic that 
no employee is specifically authorized to make mistakes. The 
issuance of 1974 billings was clearly the act of the Director and 
not some unidentifiable employee. The Directorfs name appears 
at the bottom of the billing form, and recipients are justified 
in accepting what appears on the form at face value. It is para-
doxical that the trial court placedsuch emphasis on the absence 
of a minute entry covering the revision of accounting records and 
the issuance of billings for 1974 rentals when the court gave 
supervening effect to the September Letter which was also unsanc-
tif.ied by any minute entry. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record in this case would seem to compel and would 
certainly support jury findings of implied contract between 
the parties and the elements of equitable estoppel. Appellants 
clearly acted in good faith and have demonstrated every intention 
to maintain the Leases. 
The action of the trial court in this matter should be 
reversed, and the cause remanded for trial of the fact issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
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